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Cascading Power Outages Propagate Locally in an
Influence Graph That is Not the Actual Grid Topology
Paul D. H. Hines, Senior Member, IEEE, Ian Dobson, Fellow, IEEE, and Pooya Rezaei
Abstract—In a cascading power transmission outage, compo-
nent outages propagate nonlocally; after one component outages,
the next failure may be very distant, both topologically and geo-
graphically. As a result, simple models of topological contagion do
not accurately represent the propagation of cascades in power sys-
tems. However, cascading power outages do follow patterns, some
of which are useful in understanding and reducing blackout risk.
This paper describes a method by which the data from many cas-
cading failure simulations can be transformed into a graph-based
model of influences that provides actionable information about the
many ways that cascades propagate in a particular system. The re-
sulting “influence graph” model is Markovian, in that component
outage probabilities depend only on the outages that occurred in
the prior generation. To validate the model, we compare the dis-
tribution of cascade sizes resulting from n − 2 contingencies in a
2896 branch test case to cascade sizes in the influence graph. The
two distributions are remarkably similar. In addition, we derive an
equation with which one can quickly identify modifications to the
proposed system that will substantially reduce cascade propaga-
tion. With this equation, one can quickly identify critical compo-
nents that can be improved to substantially reduce the risk of large
cascading blackouts.
Index Terms—Big data, cascading failure, complex networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER systems are generally robust to small disturbances,but unexpected combinations of failures sometimes initi-
ate long chains of cascading outages, which can result in mas-
sive and costly blackouts. Because of the low-probability high-
impact nature of cascading failures, there is limited empirical
data from which to understand the many ways that cascades
propagate through a power system. Simulations of cascading
mechanisms can produce data, but there has been insufficient
progress in extracting insights and useful statistical information
from these data.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the event sequence for the Western US blackout on
July 2, 1996 (from [10]). The sequence jumps across hundreds of kilometers at
several points, such as from ©3–©4 and from ©7–©8.
One approach to obtaining useful information is to try and
leverage successes from network science, which has an ex-
tensive literature on cascading failure and (more generally)
contagion. Models of topological contagion in which failures
spread locally from a node to its immediate neighbors [1]–[3]
have provided insight into a variety of problems, such as dis-
ease propagation [4], [5]. Similar topological contagion mod-
els have been suggested as a tool for power systems analysis
(e.g., [6], [7]).
This approach has two problems. First, in power grids it is
more appropriate to focus first on line (edge) outages, since
line outages are an order of magnitude more likely than node
(substation) outages. More importantly, as is well known to
power systems engineers, cascading outages in power systems
propagate non-locally as well as locally. In a power grid, the
next component to fail after a particular line outages may be
very distant, both geographically and topologically [8]. This
can be seen very clearly from the sequence of events in the
Western US blackout of 1996, shown in Fig. 1, in which the
failure sequence jumps across long distances at several points
in the cascade. Cascades in power networks are more similar
to the random fuse model [9] from statistical physics, in which
non-local propagation does occur.
On the other hand, simulation models that capture aspects of
detailed power grid physics and engineering are useful for un-
derstanding how cascades propagate. Importantly these models
do show the non-local propagation that is apparent in historical
cascades. Examples of physics-based models of cascading in-
0885-8950 © 2016 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution
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clude quasi-steady state models, such as DCSIMSEP [11], [12],
OPA [13], [14], Manchester model [15], and TRELSS [16], and
dynamic models, such as COSMIC [17] and the hybrid model
in [18]. While engineering models are useful, the data that re-
sult from this type of simulation are complicated and difficult
to summarize, even for a single cascading failure simulation. In
order to obtain useful statistical information, thousands, or even
millions of simulations are often required, resulting in enormous
sets of complicated output data. To summarize and understand
big data from detailed simulations, there is a need for higher-
level models of cascading in large-scale systems that are simple
enough to provide statistical insight, without abstracting away
physical details in a way that could lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. Only a few such statistical models, which do not neglect
the non-local nature of cascading, have been proposed in the
literature. Carreras et al. [19] finds critical clusters of lines in
simulated cascade data using a synchronization matrix, which
determines the critical clusters as sets of lines that frequently
overload in the same cascade and in a cascade that leads to a
large blackout. This approach does not consider the order in
which the lines overload during the cascade, but does indicate
combinations of critical lines that are associated with blackouts.
The general idea of building an influence graph describing ways
that component failures might spread goes back to [20], [21].
This form of influence graph couples Markov processes at
each node, but it remains unknown how to construct these in-
fluence graphs from data. Stochastic models in [22], [23] use
Markov-chains to represent key characteristics of simulated cas-
cades. In prior work, the authors proposed a “line-interaction
graph” approach to modeling cascades from data [24]. A matrix-
based approach, which is in some ways similar to ours, was used
to describe the probability of a cascade propagating from one
network node to another in [25]. Ref. [25] is primarily motivated
by avalanches of neurons firing, but also mentions blackouts,
and analyzes the statistics of the number of generations in a
cascade as well as the number of failures. One difference is that
[25] restores nodes in the generation after they fail, which al-
lows cascades to propagate through previously failed nodes and
prolongs the cascades. The ideas in [24] were extended in [26]
to build an interaction model of cascading that can reproduce
statistical properties of simulated cascades.
This paper presents a new influence graph method, also based
on the concepts in [24], in which we take large amounts of
data from cascade simulations and synthesize the data into a
Markovian network model. Importantly, the resulting model has
a network structure through which cascades propagate locally,
but that network structure is dramatically different from that
of the original power network. That is, the outages propagate
along the influence graph, which is completely different than the
graph topology of the grid. We emphasize that any cascading
failure simulation based on engineering principles can be used
to produce the data needed to synthesize the influence graph.
II. METHOD: STATISTICAL MODELING
OF NON-LOCAL CASCADES
A cascading failure begins with one or more initiating events,
typically component outages. For example a tree falls into a
transmission line, or an operator error results in one or more
component outages. Each initiating event will perturb the state
of the network, which may result in excessive stress on other
components. Because of the laws of power flow, these stressed
components may be topologically distant from the initiating
events. Excessive stress may cause one or more dependent out-
ages, which may subsequently cause additional stress and addi-
tional outages. Together this sequence is a cascading failure.
Prior work [27] has shown that one can gain substantial insight
into the statistical properties of cascading failure by grouping
sequences of component outages into generations, and looking
at the growth (or propagation) rates among generations. Typ-
ically, the first generation represents the exogenously caused
initiating events. Subsequent generations can be thought of as
“children” of prior “parent” outage generations. In this branch-
ing process model, each generation of failures produces some
number of dependent failures and the rate at which prior gen-
eration (parent) outages cause new (child) outages is known as
the propagation rate, λ. If |Z0 | is the total number of outages
(over many cascades) in the set of all initiating events over many
cascades and |Z1 | is the number of outages in the first dependent
generation, then the propagation rate from generation zero into
the first generation is: λ0 = |Z1 |/|Z0 |. More generally
λm =
|Zm+1 |
|Zm | (1)
However, the approach of [27] simply counts outages with-
out discriminating which component outages will result from a
particular prior outage, or how the components relate to other
components. It is clear that component outages vary in their
frequency and impact on other components. For example, the
outage of a large transmission line carrying a large amount of
power is likely to result in more dependent outages than the
failure of a smaller line. Thus, it is useful to consider different
components as having different propagation rates. With this in
mind, our model assumes that each component i produces a ran-
dom number, Ki,m , of child outages according to the following
conditional probability function:
f [k|i,m] = Pr[k outages in generation m + 1, given
a single outage of i in generation m] (2)
In this paper we assume that f [k|i,m] is a Poisson distribution,
with λi,m representing the mean number of outages propagated
by the outage of i in generation(s) m.
Finally, if component i outages and causes a dependent out-
age in the next generation, some components are more likely to
outage in the next generation than others. For the case of line
outages, this increased likelihood comes from a number of fac-
tors including the way in which currents are redistributed (which
can be estimated from line outage distribution factors) and the
proximity of particular components to their tripping threshold.
Therefore, it is important to model the conditional probability
of component j failing, given the failure of i. Let
g[j|i,m] = Pr [j fails in generation m + 1 given
a single outage of i in generation m
and one outage in generation m + 1] (3)
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For each generation m, g[j|i,m] can be considered as the i, j
element of a matrix that defines a weighted, directed graph of
influences among components.
Together f and g form a model, here referred to as an influence
graph, that is Markovian in the sense that the outage probabilities
depend only on the outages that occurred in the prior generation
(see Section III).
A. Estimating the Parameters for f and g From Data
In this paper we estimate the parameters for f and g from
data obtained from many cascading failure simulations. While
it may be possible in principle to design a method to estimate
f and g directly from engineering information about the sys-
tem, doing so would require extensive knowledge and difficult
assumptions about how cascades propagate. By estimating the
model’s parameters from data our method can be applied to any
cascading simulation or model, so long as there is a discrete set
of components that can fail, and these failures can be grouped
into generations.
Let us assume then that a trusted engineering simulation
model of cascading failure exists for a given network at a partic-
ular state, and that we can perturb this model with many random
disturbances and thus produce a large amount of cascading fail-
ure sequence data. The first step in building the influence graph
is to group the outages from the sequence data into generations,
typically by dividing the event sequences by finding pairs of
events that are separated by some amount of time (see [27],
[28]). After this grouping, we can let Z(d)m represent the set of
outages in generation m of cascade d, and |Z(d)m | represent the
number of outages within this set.
In order to estimate f one first needs to decide the extent to
which f will be modeled to depend on the generation m. For
most of the results in this paper we provide separate estimates
of f for the initiating generation f [k|i, 0] and for the subsequent
generations f [k|i, 1+]. The rationale for this is that the n− 1
security criterion results in networks being quite robust to initial
outages, but after a cascade has already started outages propa-
gate with a much higher probability. For the simulated cascades
used in this paper, this propagation rate does not change dramat-
ically among the subsequent generations of dependent outages
(m ≥ 1), denoted by 1+. Thus, we describe the post-initiating-
event propagation rates using the single (vector) distribution
f [k|i, 1+].
We assume that f [k|i,m] follows a Poisson distribution, and
need to estimate the Poisson parameter (the mean of Ki,m ) for
each component i and each generation (or set of generations), m.
Let Pi,m represent the number of times (in a set of cascades) that
each component i appears as a parent outage in generation(s)
m, and Ci,m denote the total number of “effective children”
that result from the outage of component i in the respective
generation(s). More specifically, if Di,m is the set of cascades
within which i appears as a parent in generation(s) m, then
Pi,m = |Di,m | (4)
Ci,m =
∑
d∈Di ,m
|Z(d)m+1 |
|Z(d)m |
(5)
For example, if i fails along with one other component j in
generation 0 of a particular cascade and generation 1 of that
same cascade includes three outages, we would count 3/2 = 1.5
additional “effective children” for each of i and j, and thus add
1.5 to Ci,0 and Cj,0 and increment both Pi,0 and Pj,0 . After
counting Pi,m and Ci,m for all of the cascades in a dataset, the
Poisson parameter for f [k|i,m] is λi,m = Ci,m/Pi,m .
When defined in this way, the weighted average (over i) of
each λi,m is equal to the overall propagation rate for the re-
spective generation(s), λm . For the specific case in which we
estimate two sets of parameters for λi,0 and λi,1+ we get the
following pair of relationships:
λ0 =
|Z1 |
|Z0 | =
∑n
i=1 λi,0Pi,0∑n
i=1 Pi,0
(6)
λ1+ =
∑M−1
m=1 |Zm+1 |∑M−1
m=1 |Zm |
=
∑n
i=1 λi,1+Pi,1+∑n
i=1 Pi,1+
(7)
where M is the maximum generation index m over all of the
cascades in the dataset.
To build the graph of inter-component influences, G, we again
iterate through each cascade d and generation m. For each d and
m in which i occurs as a parent and j occurs as a child in the next
generation (m + 1), we add the fraction 1/|Z(d)m | to a counter
gc [j|i]. Finally, the individual elements of G are estimated as
follows:
g[j|i] = gc [j|i]∑n
j=1 gc [j|i]
(8)
Normalizing in this way ensures that g[j|i] acts as a conditional
probability, as per our definition in (3), such that ∑nj=1 g[j|i] =
1. Note that in this paper we assume that g does not change
with generation m. The reason for this is that even with data
from many simulated cascades, only a fairly limited number of
observations are available for most of the potential sequence
pairs i → j.
B. 6-Bus Illustration
To illustrate the process of building f and g, this section de-
scribes the formation of the influence graph for a slightly mod-
ified version of the Wood and Wollenberg 6-bus test case [29]
(see Fig. 2). After removing two transmission lines (for graph-
ical clarity), all of the pre-contingency line flows were below
the rated limits, but the system was not initially n− 1 secure.
To generate cascading outage data, 1000 sets of one or more
initiating outages were randomly generated assuming that each
of the nine transmission lines had an equal outage probability of
p0 = 1/100. Dependent outage sequences were generated using
the DCSIMSEP cascading failure model from [11], [12]. These
sequences were then grouped into generations by separating out-
ages that were distant in time by at least Δt = 5 seconds. Note
that this is a relatively small value for Δt compared to previous
branching process applications (e.g., [27]). Since the 6-bus case
is very small, and used here only to illustrate the influence graph
concept, choosing a small Δt seemed appropriate. Given data
separated into generations we computed a single distribution
for f , as shown in Table I. Similarly the parameters for g were
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Fig. 2. The modified 6 bus test case with three generators (circles) and 3 loads
(triangles). Line widths indicate absolute line loading (MW) and colors indicate
precent of rated loading.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR f FOR THE 6-BUS TEST CASE
Line: 1-2 1-4 2-3 2-4 2-5 3-5 3-6 4-5 5-6
Pi 412 416 401 106 498 100 104 503 193
Ci 208.5 98.5 195.5 401 298.5 99 102 297.5 107.5
λi 0.51 0.24 0.49 3.78 0.60 0.99 0.98 0.59 0.56
Fig. 3. Illustration of the influence graph for the 6-bus test case. The edge
weights represent the conditional probability of one line outage propagating
associated line outages.
computed as described in Section II-A. The results for f and g
are illustrated in Fig. 3.
A number of observations result from inspection of f and g.
From f we see that one of the nine lines (line 2-4) has a much
higher propagation rate than the other eight, a clear sign of its
critical importance to this particular system. We also find two
different common paths of cascading. One path includes the set
of lines {3-6, 5-6, 1-2, 1-4} and a second includes {3-5, 4-5,
2-5, 2-3}. The outage of 2-4 can propagate a subset of either of
these two paths.
III. SIMULATING CASCADING FAILURES GIVEN f AND g
Once formed, f and g can be used to rapidly generate many
synthetic cascades, which have statistical properties similar to
those of the original data.
Fig. 4. Illustration of an influence graph simulation for a small network with
six components. Initially node 2 fails due to some exogenous cause. Based
on a draw from f2 , this failure causes k = 2 dependent failures in the next
generation. Drawing twice from g[j|i = 2] results in nodes 1 and 5 failing in
the next generation. In generation 1, the failure of node 1 does not produce any
additional children, but the failure of 3 produces one “child” failure (node 3).
Finally, the failure of node 3 does not produce any children, thus ending the
cascade.
To simulate the influence graph (see Fig. 4), we start with a
large set of initiating events. These can be produced by a va-
riety of sampling methods, such as Monte-Carlo or complete
enumeration of a plausible contingency list (e.g., all n− 2’s).
For Monte-Carlo sampling, if initiating outages are assumed to
be independent, then this can be a simple vector of failure prob-
abilities for each of n components. Given the chosen sampling
method, the influence graph can be simulated as follows:
1) Initialize the cascade index: d = 1
2) Initialize the generation index: m = 0
3) Produce a set of exogenous initiating outages Z(d)0 via the
chosen sampling method.
4) For each outage i ∈ Z(d)m , do the following: (a) Determine
how many child outages κ result from i by sampling from
f [k|i,m]. (b) Determine which outages result from outage
i by sampling from g[j|i] κ times. This sampling is done
using Bernoulli trials, such that for each trial {1 . . . κ}
component j will fail if g[j|i] > r, where r is a uniformly
distributed random number 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. The result is a set
of outages for the next dependent generation, Z(d)m+1 .
5) If Z(d)m+1 includes at least one outage, then increment the
generation index m = m + 1 and continue from Step 4.
6) Otherwise, increment the cascade counter d = d + 1 and
continue from Step 2.
Note that a given component j may be selected for failure
more than once. Since a component cannot fail multiple times
(and restoration is not included in this model), this means that
the total number of new child outages may be slightly less than κ.
A. Simulated Cascades in a Larger Test Case
To illustrate the influence graph method, we produced a
dataset of cascading outages by simulating the impact of
each n− 2 transmission branch (transformer or line) outage
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Fig. 5. Probability distribution of cascade sizes, measured by the number of
branches failed, for the original DCSIMSEP simulation data (empirical), and for
the influence graph (simulated) data. Data are binned so that each bin contains
at least 26 observations.
Fig. 6. Empirical probability density functions for the component-wise prop-
agation rates in the initiating generation, λi ,0 , and the subsequent generations,
λi ,1+ . Data are binned as in Fig. 5.
in an n− 1 secure version of the winter peak Polish case
available with MATPOWER [30], using the same simulator
(DCSIMSEP) and case data as in [11], [12]. The test case has
n = 2896 branches, which resulted in n(n− 1)/2 = 4 191 960
initiating n− 2 contingencies, of which 3170 resulted in at least
one dependent outage. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of cascade
sizes for this dataset.
The outage data were subsequently separated into generations
by assigning all of the initiating outages to the first generation
and distributing the dependent events into subsequent genera-
tions by assigning events that were at least 30 seconds apart [27]
to different generations. We chose this value for Δt based on
the fact that fast transients and auto-recloser actions are typi-
cally completed within 30 seconds. We also tested Δt = 15s and
Δt = 60s, and found that the parameters for f were not substan-
tially altered within this range. After separating the outage data
into generations, the parameters for f and g were constructed as
described in Section II-A. Fig. 6 shows the distribution of values
for λi,0 and λi,1+ . Notably, both distributions are heavy tailed;
for the majority of components λi,m = 0, but a few components
tend to produce a much larger number of “child” outages.
Finally, we simulated artificial cascades by applying each of
the 4 191 960 possible n− 2 contingencies with the resulting
Fig. 7. Comparison of the outage rate of components in the influence-graph
simulated data and in the original cascading failure data. Circles (◦) show the
rates for all dependent events and× shows only dependent events that occurred
in generation m = 4 and later.
influence graph. Fig. 5 shows the resulting probability distribu-
tion of cascade sizes, measured as the total number of outages in
each cascade (including the initiating outages), for the empirical
data and the simulated data from the influence graph. The influ-
ence graph method matches the empirical data quite well, with
the exception that the influence graph does not reproduce the
frequency of the very longest cascades observed in the empirical
data. Otherwise the match between the simulated and empirical
data is quite good.
Another way to compare the influence graph data to the orig-
inal data is to look at the frequency with which particular com-
ponents appear in the two datasets. One would expect a valid
model of the original data to show that component i outages
with a frequency that is similar to its outage rate in the original
data. To evaluate if this is indeed the case, Fig. 7 compares the
outage rates (the number of dependent outages of i divided by
the total number of dependent outages) in the simulated data
and in the empirical data. The match between these two rates
provides further evidence for the validity of this approach.
IV. EXTRACTING USEFUL INFORMATION
FROM THE INFLUENCE GRAPH
Once the influence graph (f and g) is built from data the
results can shed valuable insight into the general properties of
cascading in a particular system.
In order to do so, we first combine f and g into a single graph
H that captures the relative strength of the influences among the
component outages. Consider that in an arbitrary generation m
of influence-graph-simulated cascade d, component i fails alone
(Z(d)m = {i}) and a random draw from f [k|i,m] indicates that
there should be (about) K = k failures in the next generation.
Then the conditional probability that a particular component
j fails in the next generation (m + 1), given that i failed in
generation m and that generation m + 1 includes exactly k
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failures is
Pr(j|{i, k}) = 1− (1− g[j|i])k (9)
Let hi,j,m be the conditional probability that a particular com-
ponent j fails in generation m + 1 given that i failed in m,
over all values of k. hi,j,m can be computed from (9) using the
assumption that K is a Poisson random variable:
hi,j,m =
n−1∑
k=0
Pr(j|{i, k})f [k|i,m] (10)
∼
∞∑
k=0
(
1− (1− g[j|i])k) f [k|i,m] (11)
=
∞∑
k=0
(
1− (1− g[j|i])k) λ
k
i,m
k!
e−λi , m (12)
= 1− e−λi , m eλi , m (1−g [j |i]) (13)
= 1− e−λi , m g [j |i] (14)
Thus defined, hi,j,m can be thought of as the i, j element of
a matrix Hm that combines f and g. Hm has the properties
of a weighted adjacency matrix for a directed graph. Since, for
our larger test case, we defined two different distributions for
f [k|i,m = 0] and f [k|i,m = 1+], we end up with two different
matrices H0 and H1+ that, respectively, describe the propaga-
tion of the initiating contingency and the subsequent dependent
events. Note that the nodes of the influence graph do not rep-
resent system states, and thus H differs from a typical Markov
chain transition matrix. In particular, H is not a stochastic matrix
because the events comprising one of the components outaging
after component i outages are neither exclusive nor exhaustive;
it is routine that no components or several components outage
after component i outages.
A. Using H to Find Critical Components
A particularly important question in the study of cascading
failure risk is that of identifying critical components, the failure
of which could result in particularly large cascading failures. Or,
more practically, finding components that could be improved in
some way to substantially reduce blackout risk. Prior work [12],
[31] has suggested that some components, when they fail as a
part of a multiple initiating contingency, contribute orders of
magnitude more to blackout risk, relative to the average com-
ponent. Here we suggest a method for using the information
contained in H0 and H1+ to find those components that could
propagate large cascading failures if they fail during a cascade,
as opposed to during the initiating contingency. This type of
information could be useful to power system planners in identi-
fying components that should be prioritized for more thorough
vegetation management or upgraded protection systems, or to
operators in making adjustments to the dispatch to reduce black-
out risk by decreasing line loadings.
We start by defining a vector of independent binary
(Bernoulli) random variables, s0 , that describes the space of
possible initiating contingencies. s0 is defined such that si,0 = 1
indicates that component i outages as a part of the initiating con-
tingency and si,0 = 0 means that i did not initially fail. pi,0 is the
probability that si,0 = 1 and thus pi,0 also is also the expected
value of si,0 . More generally, let pi,m represent the probability
that i outages in generation m, and pm be the column vector of
these probabilities.
Let us now use Hm and the outage probabilities pm to find
the probability that a particular component j outages in gener-
ation m + 1. hi,j,m gives us the probability that j outages in
generation m + 1, given that i outaged in generation m. The
probability pj,m+1 that j outages in generation m + 1 is the
probability of the union of all the ways that j might have failed.
If the individual interaction probabilities in H are small and
the ways are independent (or disjoint), then we can neglect the
higher order probabilities (such as the probability that j failed
due to the combination of i and k), and obtain the following ap-
proximation for the probability that j fails in generation m + 1:
pj,m+1 ∼=
n∑
i=1
Pr[j(m + 1)|i(m)] Pr[i(m)] (15)
=
n∑
i=1
hi,j,m pi,m (16)
As a result, the outage probabilities in the first and subsequent
generations can be estimated by simple matrix multiplication:
pᵀ1 = p
ᵀ
0H0 (17)
pᵀm+1 = p
ᵀ
mH1+ , m ≥ 1 (18)
After a long cascade, the probability of each component having
failed at some point during a cascade (the vector a) can be found
as follows:
aᵀ 
∞∑
m=0
pᵀm = p
ᵀ
0 + p
ᵀ
0H0
∞∑
m=0
Hm1+ (19)
Eq. (19) will evaluate to a finite quantity, so long as the absolute
values of the eigenvalues of H1+ are less than 1, which holds
for our test cases. Since
∑∞
m=0 H
m
1+ = (I−H1+)−1 , Eq. (19)
can be rewritten more simply as
aᵀ = pᵀ0 + p
ᵀ
0H0(I−H1+)−1 (20)
This is a useful expression as it enables us to quickly understand
which components are most likely to be involved in a cascading
failure. Also, the sum of a gives an estimate of the expected size
of the cascades that could result from the vector of initiating
probabilities p0 .
Now we turn our attention to using (20) to estimate the im-
pact of design changes on cascading failure propagation. Let us
assume that we know that if we upgrade component j (perhaps
by replacing line j’s distance relays with current differential re-
lays, or improving vegetation management on its transmission
corridor) we can reduce the probability of line j outaging due
to an overload, in response to other outages in the system. We
can represent this change by reducing the probabilities in the
jth column of H0 and H1+ by subtracting column perturbation
vectors δ0 and δ1 from H0 and H1+ , respectively. Then the
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Fig. 8. Illustration of the combined influence matrix H for the 6 bus case.
Edge weights show the probability of an outage at the origin node resulting in
an outage at the destination node.
result of the perturbations to H0 and H1+ can be estimated by
calculating
a′j
ᵀ = pᵀ0 + p
ᵀ
0 (H0 − δ0eᵀj )(I−H1+ + δ1eᵀj )−1 (21)
where ej is an indicator vector with 1 in the jth element and 0
elsewhere.
However, what we really care about, if we want to estimate
the impact of potential upgrades, is the change in a that results
from the perturbations δ0 and δ1 , not the absolute value of a′j .
This change is computed by subtracting (21) from (20):
Δaj ᵀ = aᵀ − a′j ᵀ = pᵀ0 (H0(I−H1+)−1
− (H0 − δ0eᵀj )(I−H1+ + δ1eᵀj )−1) (22)
Applying the Sherman–Morrison formula [32] for rank-1
updates of an inverted matrix and simplifying leads to
Δaj ᵀ = p
ᵀ
0 δ0e
ᵀ
j (I−H1+)−1 + pᵀ0 (H0 − δ0eᵀj )
× (I−H1+)
−1δ1e
ᵀ
i (I−H1+)−1
1 + eᵀj (I−H1+)−1δ1
(23)
Finally we can sum Δaj to define the overall impact αj of
modifications δ0 and δ1 on line j:
αj =
n∑
k=1
Δaj,k (24)
By computing αj for each line j from the parameters of the
influence graph we can quickly estimate the impact of potential
modifications without the need for extensive simulations of these
modifications. This metric (24) allows us to quickly compute,
from data, the relative importance (or “criticality”) of particular
components in a power system.
B. Critical Components in the 6-Bus Case
To illustrate the result of combining f and g to produce a
single influence graph, as defined in (14), Fig. 8 shows H for
the 6-bus test case presented in Section II-B. (For this small case
we assume that H = H0 = H1+ .) This figure clearly shows
the importance of line (2-4), since it has a high likelihood of
initiating four subsequent outages, which can, in turn, propagate
additional outages. However, (2-4) only appears as a initiating
event, as indicated by the fact that this node has zero in-degree;
other outages do not result in the outage of (2-4). As a result,
modifying the probability of (2-4) failing endogenously (within
a cascade) will not have an effect on cascade sizes. On the other
hand, the failure of either (2-5) or (4-5) can propagate as many as
three additional outages, making these components candidates
for potential upgrades.
These qualitative observations can be made quantitative by
applying equations (20) and (24) to H for the 6-bus case. The
importance of component (2-4) to the system can be observed
by computing (20) after setting p0 to indicate that only (2-4)
outages initially, with probability 1. In this case, the expected
cascade size from (20) is aᵀ1 = 5.16. An initial outage of the
other lines in the network is expected to produce much smaller
cascades. For all of the remaining lines aᵀ1 < 2.28. Similarly,
we can estimate the effect of potential upgrades to this system by
computing αj in (24). To do so we choose δ0 = δ1 = δ equal to
1/2 of the jth column of H for each of the 9 lines in this network,
and set p0 to a vector of initiating probabilities with p0,i =
0.001, ∀i. The results (unsurprisingly) tell us that modifications
to (2-5) and (4-5) will be most beneficial, with α(2−5) = 0.021
and α(4−5) = 0.022. αj < 0.015 for the remaining components.
Since they have no in-degree (no inward links) αi = 0 for (2-4),
(3-5) and (3-6).
C. Polish Test Case Results
To test these ideas for a larger network, we computed H0
and H1+ from f [k|i, 0], f [k|i, 1+] and g[j|i], and studied the
properties of the resulting influence graph. Fig. 9(a) shows H1+
for the Polish test case. While the detailed structure is difficult
to visualize, what is clear is that the influence graph has a
topological structure that is distinctly different from that of the
underlying physical infrastructure of buses and transmission
lines. We argue that this difference in structure at least partially
explains the substantial differences between the vulnerability
implications that one obtains from power grid simulations and
from simple topological metrics computed from the physical
network, as observed in [33].
In order to test our metric for component criticality, we com-
puted αj for each of the n = 2896 branches. To do so all of the
initiating event probabilities were set to pi,0 = 1/8760, based
on the assumption that all components outage at a rate of about 1
outage per year. Note that this assumed outage rate has no effect
on our conclusions about which component is the most critical,
since the metric in (23) is scaled uniformly by p0 . Secondly, we
computed the perturbations δ0 and δ1 based on an assumed 50%
reduction in the propagation rate.
Fig. 9(b) shows the empirical probability distribution for the
resulting criticality metric. This distribution clearly shows a
heavy-tailed (nearly power-law) pattern: while the vast majority
of the potential upgrades have little-to-no effect (αj < 10−7 for
83% of the components), a few components have nearly three
orders of magnitude greater impact than this.
To evaluate the extent to which this information could be
useful in a planning context, we performed the following cal-
culation. We took the ten lines that appeared to be most critical
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Fig. 9. (a) Illustration of the combined H1+ for the Polish test case. Blue nodes/links show the physical power grid, and red nodes/links show the influences
among branch outages. Link thicknesses indicate power flow magnitudes (blue) and influence probabilities (red). Note that for graphical clarity very small
influences are not depicted in this figure. (b) The probability distribution of the metric αi for the same test case. (c) The risk from cascading blackouts initiated by
n − 2 contingencies in the original system before and after increasing flow limits for the ten most critical lines.
from αj and then doubled their flow limits used in the cascad-
ing failure simulation, without changing the pre-contingency
dispatch or power flows. Something similar to this type of in-
creased flow limit could be accomplished by disabling backup
(e.g., Zone 3) relaying systems for these critical lines, by re-
placing simple distance relays with more sophisticated current-
differential relaying systems, or by re-conductoring.
After increasing the line flow limits, we re-simulated the
entire set of n− 2 contingencies and recomputed the cascading
failure sizes. While this change does not substantially change
the frequency of small cascades, the impact on the frequency of
very large cascades, which have the greatest impact on blackout
risk, is dramatic. The probability of a cascade that includes 50
or more outages goes down by 94% in the modified system. As
shown in Fig. 9(c), this relatively small modification reduces
the risk of large cascading blackouts (those resulting in 5% or
more load shedding) by about 80%.
Another way to compare these two cases is to look at the
propagation rate λ1+ in the system before and after modification.
In the original data the propagation rate was λ1+ = 0.92. In the
modified system, the propagation rate is reduced to λ1+ = 0.79.
This relatively small difference can have a large impact on the
probability of large cascades. This is typical cascading behavior.
For example, a simple branching process, with one initiating
outage and 2896 components, has probability 0.05 of producing
a cascade of size 50 or larger at λ = 0.92. If this rate is reduced
to λ = 0.79, the probability of relatively small cascades is not
changed much, but the probability of a cascade of 50 or more is
reduced by 85% and the probability of a cascade of size 100 or
more is reduced by 96%.
It is important to note that this method of finding critical up-
grades differs substantially from conventional contingency rank-
ing approaches. Whereas contingency ranking seek to identify
components that would have substantial impact on the network
TABLE II
AVERAGE CASCADE SIZES BEFORE AND AFTER UPGRADING 10 LINES
SELECTED FROM EITHER THE PERFORMANCE INDEX (PI)
OR INFLUENCE GRAPH (IG) METHODS
Before After, PI After, IG
Load shed 5910 MW 3682 MW 1324 MW
Dependent outages 55.8 42.5 14.1
if they occur as an initiating outage, our method seeks to find
components that are important if they fail during a cascade. Re-
gardless of this difference, one might conjecture that standard
contingency ranking methods, such as the performance index
approach in [34], might work equally as well, since they can
be used to find components that substantially impact system
loading levels. To test whether this was indeed the case, we
computed the performance index from [34] for each transmis-
sion branch in the Polish test case and compared the result to
α from (24). The two metrics showed only a weak correlation
(ρ = 0.2), and α was much more effective in selecting compo-
nents for upgrades. Specifically, we used the performance index
method to identify 10 branches for upgrade (doubling the flow
capacity as before), and then simulated the 614 n− 2 contin-
gencies that produced at least 10 dependent transmission line
outages in the re-modified case. While the re-modified case also
produced smaller cascades relative to the original data, the influ-
ence graph method produced a much larger reduction in cascade
sizes (see Table II).
V. DISCUSSION
These results suggest that the influence graph approach can
be used to simulate cascades that are statistically similar to those
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produced by an engineering simulator, and (more usefully) to
quickly identify critical components and upgrades in a large
power network. However, it is important to note that the influ-
ence graph is a statistical model, and thus includes assumptions
that one should be aware of. Different assumptions are needed
for the formulation, construction and usage of the model; the
following paragraphs explain these assumptions.
The influence graph formulation at the beginning of
Section II makes the standard branching process assumptions
of independently generating the number of failures in the next
generation from each of the failures in the current generation.
The offspring distributions f are assumed to be Poisson with
parameters λi,m that can vary with component i and with
generation m. The model further assumes that the particular
component failures that fail in the next generation can be
modeled probabilistically as described in (3) for a single
component failure in a generation, and that multiple failures in
a generation propagate independently according to (3). These
assumptions are also usefully discussed in [25]. In addition,
the model assumes that multiple outages in a generation each
propagate independently to the next generation. (This is a
standard and surprisingly successful assumption in applying
branching processes.) We acknowledge that outages can and do,
in real power systems, mutually interact in producing outages
in the next generation, but the experience with neglecting the
branching process assumption and assuming independence in
power systems [27], [35] (and other subjects [25]) is that good
predictions of the total number of outages can nevertheless be
made. In power systems, Refs. [27], [35] validate the branching
process assumption for the purpose of predicting the total
number of line outages using real line outages. Branching
processes can match the distribution of number of simulated line
outages simulated by the OPA simulation in [28] and load shed
simulated by the OPA simulation [36]. There is also a match for
the distribution of load shed for the TRELSS simulation in one
case of an industrial system of about 6250 buses [36]. Moreover,
branching processes can analytically approximate CASCADE,
a high-level probabilistic model of cascading [37] that explicitly
models the additive effect of multiple line outages at each stage.
To estimate the parameters of the model (Section II-A), one
needs to decide on a method for the division of the outages in
each cascade into generations. If there are multiple outages in a
generation, then the offspring of each outage are approximated
by dividing by the number of outages. An important assump-
tion required for any statistical technique is that sufficient data
was simulated for the estimation of parameters. The detail in
representing the cascading, such as how much it depends on the
cascade generation, must be traded off against this requirement
for sufficient data.
In order to generate cascades with the influence graph in
Section III, one needs an assumption about how to draw from
f and g. There are several possibilities here. For example, one
could draw to obtain precisely the number of outages indicated
by the draw from f , but this would require adjusting the proba-
bilities in g to reflect the fact that some components are already
outaged. To avoid this, we assume that the draw from f indi-
cates the number of times one should draw from g. Since no
adjustments to were made to g during this process, the result
is that some components can be marked for failure multiple
times. Since real transmission components cannot outage mul-
tiple times without restoration, we count each failed component
only once.
Finally, in order to perform the linear algebra in (16)–(23) and
hence identify critical elements in Section IV, further approxi-
mations are needed. Higher order probabilities are neglected to
obtain the matrix multiplication in (15), and we need to allow
the system to count the multiple failures of some components.
In addition, in order to allow (19) we need to assume that H1+
does not change over the course of an arbitrarily long cascade.
Our approach to estimate the parameters of f , which describe
the propagation of outages, is based on standard Harris esti-
mators from the theory of branching processes [27]. We use a
rather straightforward approach to estimate the parameters of
g, which describe the network structure and the interactions
between outages. More sophisticated approaches may well sig-
nificantly improve the performance of this estimation in future
work, such as starting from Bayesian priors or adapting graph
estimation algorithms from machine learning [38].
There is a need for future work that evaluates each of these
assumptions in detail, and works to identify ways to relax these
assumptions without overcomplicating the model.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new approach to cascading failure risk
analysis, in which we transform massive amounts of data from
many cascading failures into an “influence graph” that describes
the many ways that cascades propagate within that system. We
check that the (much simpler) influence graph conforms to the
original data by comparing the distribution of cascading outage
sizes from a cascading failure simulator to the distribution of
cascade sizes generated from the influence graph. The two ap-
proaches produce remarkably similar cascade size distributions.
In addition, we derive a method with which the influence graph
can be used to quickly identify component upgrades that can
have a significant impact on cascading failure risk.
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